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The Self-Judging Clause and Self-Interest
In urging repeal of the Connally Reservation during the debate at
the Pacific Northwest Regional Meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion, Mr. Larson argued that it is to the interest of the United States
to repeal the "self-judging" Reservation because its existence provides
a means by which any nation may evade the World Court's jurisdiction
when the United States seeks to obtain redress in the court.
by Arthur Larson * Director of the World Rule of Law Center, Duke University
M Y ARGUMENT FOR the repeal of
the "self-judging" clause in the Amer-
ican acceptance of the World Court's
jurisdiction will be addressed solely to
cold-blooded American self-interest.
That self-interest is severely damaged
because of the reciprocal right of every
other nation in the world to invoke this
clause against us and thus throw us
out of court whenever we might at-
tempt to vindicate a legal claim on
behalf of our country or one of its
citizens or corporations.
The story begins with the Norwegian
Loans case. Norway had issued a large
quantity of bonds in France, payable
in gold. Then Norway went off the gold
'standard and refused to pay in gold-
France, confronted with severe loss to
hundreds of thrifty Frenchmen, brought
suit in the International Court of Jus-
tice demanding payment in gold.
France had a self-judging clause sim-
ilar to our Connally Reservation. Nor-
way did not. The International Court
held that, as a matter of reciprocity,
Norway could exercise France's claimed
reservation and call the entire transac-
tion domestic. Result: financial loss in
cold cash to citizens in France. Cause:
A supposedly protective clause inter-
posed by the guardians of French in-
terests. Sequel: France last year re-
pealed her self-judging clause.
Since this case was decided only in
1957, the full implications have not
begun to sink into the consciousness of
the American Bar and the American
people. If the position of the American
Bar Association opposing the Connally
Reservation was valid for reasons of
self-interest in 1946, it is twenty times
as valid today.
Let us put the present state of affairs
in the bluntest possible terms. The
presence of this self-judging clause in
our declaration means that we our-
selves have destroyed, absolutely and
without exception, every conceivable
right that we might ever have had to
enforce any legal claim against any
country under any circumstances for
any damage to our rights under the
general jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. For now. when-
ever we try to assert as plaintiffs any
legitimate right in the International
Court, it is our opponents who merely
have to utter the magic words, "This
is domestic" and we are thrown out
of court with no legal recourse whatso-
ever. France found this out the hard
way, and repealed her self-judging
clause. Must we similarly have to sub-
ject innocent Americans to severe fi-
nancial loss before we learn our lesson?
After all, we are the ones who need
the protection more than any other
country. We are the ones with $45,000,-
000,000 invested within other coun-
tries' boundaries, with the ever-present
danger of damage, confiscation, and
discrimination. We are the ones with
500,000 nationals and 700,000 tourists
abroad, always in danger of personal
injury and property damage. We are
the ones with foreign bases, communi-
cations installations, transportation fa-
cilities, and economic and technical aid
projects. The chances of our needing,
as plaintiffs, the help of the court are
many times as great as the chances of
our appearing as defendant.
We would do well to recall the well-
known lines of Robert Frost:
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out.
The principal effect of what we have
done is not so much to wall the other
fellow out of court, as to wall ourselves
out, whenever we have a valid claim.
One of the least-known features of
this situation is the fact that this self-
judging clause also destroys valuable
rights under our economic aid pro-
grams that were specifically created in
the name of national self-interest. The
Economic Cooperation Act of April 3,
1948, stipulates that every economic
aid agreement must include a provision
"submitting for the decision of the
International Court of Justice or of
any arbitral tribunal mutually agreed
upon any case espoused by the United
States Government involving compen-
sation of a national of the United States
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for governmental measures affecting
his property rights, including contracts
with, or concessions from, such coun-
try." But since the self-judging clause,
'omplete with its reciprocal backlash,
is incorporated by reference in all these
agreements, we have thus once more
completely and effectively destroyed at
one stroke all the rights that supposed-
ly were laboriously built up both in the
statute and in the agreements for com-
pulsory judicial settlement of disputes
negotiated in the pursuance of the stat-
ute. Consequently, if the current debate
were conducted on the basis of really
intelligent self-interest, there would be
no escape from the conclusion that the
self-judging clause must be repealed in
order to restore these rights of Amer-
ican citizens, businesses, and investors
which we thought we were protecting,
but which the self-judging amendment
has destroyed.
There are other items of American
self-interest at stake here, perhaps not
so obvious and material, but in some
ways even more important.
There is a strong self-interest in re-
establishing our position as leaders in
the struggle to bring about a lawful
world. We might as well face the fact
that the United States seriously needs
at this very moment a tangible action
to demonstrate our devotion to law in
the eyes of the world. Indeed, we are
already losing our opportunity for
leadership here. France has repealed
her self-judging clause. So has India.
So has Britain.
The clause hurts our self-interest also
because it makes us look foolish to
intelligent people everywhere. There is
nothing more elementary in every legal
system of the world than that no man
should be a judge in his own cause. To
assert such a right on the domestic
scene would make anyone a laughing
stock. To assert it on the international
scene is no less preposterous.
Our self-interest is also hurt because
this declaration is probably invalid. Ar-
ticle 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute of
the International Court, to which the
United States is a party, and to whose
provisions it is therefore committed as
a matter of law, states:
In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by the decision of the
Court.
Of course the greatest self-interest of
all is the contribution this move would
make toward a solid building of the
practical dispute-settling procedures
that are essential to achieving peace in
a dispute-ridden world.
As against all these demonstrable
values accruing to the self-interest of
the United States, the arguments for
retention of the Connally Reservation
are found to consist entirely of imagi-
nary fears which are never supported
by citations of the record of the court,
of the background and character and
performance of the judges, or of the
actual provisions of international law.
They are based entirely on what
"might" be done to our domestic af-
fairs by an imaginary court, made up
of altogether unheard-of judges apply-
ing international law resembling noth-
ing that has ever been seen on this
earth.
The claim that the court might inake
us raise our immigration quotas, lower
our tariffs, and give away the Panama
Canal-these three ugly sisters that have
been wheeled out as the standard hob-
goblins from the time of Senator Con-
nally's remarks on the floor of the
Senate right down to the present-are
the result of two elementary fallacies.
The one fallacy is the failure to dis-
tinguish between the judicial function
and the legislative function: the other
is the failure to distinguish between
domestic and international affairs.
You cannot go at this question by
sweeping statements that "tariffs are
international". You have to specify
what question about tariffs you are
talking about. The question that op-
ponents of repeal are really talking
about is a question of policy on
whether tariffs should be raised or
lowered, or whether immigration quotas
should be raised or lowered. That pol-
icy, in the first place, must be con-
ceived and executed as a legislative act.
A court can only apply the law as it
finds it. It cannot compel Congress to
pass laws that it does not want to pass
or compel the President to make
treaties he does not want to make.
Moreover, the policy decision on
whether to raise or lower tariffs or
immigration quotas or make new
treaties is a domestic policy decision.
Similarly, as to the Panama Canal, no-
court can tell the President or the
Senate to make a new treaty giving
away the Panama Canal. This would be
both an executive and a legislative act.
The existing treaty has been reaffirmed
by mutual consent as recently as 1955,
and has been declared valid by the
Supreme Court of Panama itself in
Gris v. The New Panama Canal Co..
and in every international law decisios
or source that can be found on record.
There is not one ounce of support in
all of existing international law to
support the charge that the Interna-
tional Court could make us raise or
lower tariffs or immigration quotas or
part with the Panama Canal against
our will.
This being so, the arguments of the
defenders of the Connally Reservation
can be narrowed down to the fantastic
assumption that the members of the
present court, who comprise some of
the most distinguished and conserva-
tive judges and international law ex-
perts in the world, and who have
compiled a consistent record of very
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careful limitation of their jurisdiction
to clearly international affairs, will sud-
denly simultaneously all lose their
minds and start making decisions the
flat contrary of what they have made
for several decades. And this assump.
tion is made in spite of the fact that the
judges hold office for nine years, so
that the character of the court could
not possibly change radically in the
period of time covered by a new dec-
laration. All this then is precisely the
sort of thing any court in the land
would reject as "speculation and con-
jecture". Perhaps this would not mat-
ter, if this were only an academic dis-
cussion. But, as I have shown earlier,
we are allowing these chimeras and
day-dreams to deprive us of protection
of very real legal rights that may be
worth hundreds of millions of dollars
to American individuals, corporations,
and national interests, and we are al-
lowing these hypothetical fears to rob
us of very real and present prestige,
international leadership, and opportu-
nities for practical improvement in the
dispute-settling structure that is essen-
tial to a real peace.
Since the opposition talk entirely in
terms of fears, let me plant one little
fear in their minds that they might
think about. It is quite conceivable
that the spark which sets off the nuclear
war ending civilization and possibly
even life on earth might be a dispute
which could have been settled by judi-
cial means, if we had used these
precious years to strengthen the struc-
ture of international law and adjudica.
tion. It might be another Suez; it
might be the Gulf of Aqaba; it might
be one of the many boundary or waters
disputes now festering in the world. If
that day should ever come, I would not
want to be in the shoes of those who
used their efforts to block the develop-
ment of dispute-settling processes that
could have kept that spark from setting
off the final holocaust.
But I am confident that day will
never come, because I am confident
that the lawyers of America will con-
tinue to take the lead in doing the solid
constructive work, including strength-
ening our own use of the World Court,
that is necessary to build that rule of
law between nations which many of us
now believe may be the last, best hope
of earth.
American Bar Association- Election for State Delegates
Jurisdiction
Arizona
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Illinois
Iowa
Maine
Massachusetts (Vacancy)
Michigan
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
Oklahoma
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island (Vacancy)
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Washington
Wyoming
Delegates Elected
C. A. Carson III, Phoenix
Samuel H. Platcow, New Haven
Francis W. Hill, Washington
Barnabas F. Sears, Chicago
Ingalls Swisher, Iowa City
Robinson Verrill, Cumberland Foreside
*Erwin N. Griswold. Cambridge
Henry L. Woolfenden, Detroit
Gibson B. Witherspoon, Meridian
Emmett C. Angland, Great Falls
George H. Turner, Lincoln
John H. Yauch, Jr., Newark
Howard T. Tumilty, Oklahoma City
Francisco Ponsa-Feliu. San Juan
"j'Colin MacR. Makepeace, Providence
Walton J. McLeod, Jr., Walterboro
Roy E. Willy, Sioux Falls
Cecil E. Burney, Corpus Christi
Richard S. Munter, Spokane
Edward E. Murane, Casper
vTo fill vacancy expiring with adjournment of 1962 Annual Meeting.
tTo fill vacancy expiring with adjournment of 1961 Annual Meeting.
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Ballots
Mailed
732
1647
3335
6198
1568
336
2254
2867
749
395
933
2294
1554
174
524
647
308
4534
1703
256
33,008
Ballots
Returned
461
579
1033
3817
881
168
1236
1644
560
312
484
1131
929
41
237
358
153
2639
1195
162
18,020
Percent
of Return
63
35
31
62
56
50
55
57
75
79
52
49
60
24
45
55
50
58
70
63
55
